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Operations Division. At that time, the architects did not clearly know such inclusion would affect the way C2 and ISR assets employed in training and war. An instructor at the USAFWS (1993 -1996) , I experienced first hand what the capability of highly integrated C2ISR could accomplish. When these two systems come together and work together for a common goal, they produce a formidable force multiplier that proves to be decisive in combat scenarios. Yet, several factors limit C2 and ISR. First, these communities do not regularly exercise together. Secondly, the two communities have different supporters within the Air Operations Center (AOC). This practice diminishes the USAF's ability to achieve integrated C2 and ISR.
This paper highlights the USAF's need to completely integrate C2 and ISR to make it a more effective force multiplier and to enhance the effectiveness of Time Sensitive
Targeting (TST). Currently, this integration effort is focused on developing technology specifically aimed at integrating C2 and ISR within the AOC. This is the vision of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and is a high priority for the Joint Staff as well. However, we need to develop an intellectual architecture and organizational structure before we can vi effectively incorporate a technological solution. This research does not advocate retarding technological growth, usurping the authority of the AOC director, adding another layer of "command" into command and control, or lobby for a particular platform; rather, it encourages commanders to accept a new thought process in employing C2 and ISR in order to enhance the effective engagement of Time Sensitive
Targets. Integrated C2ISR produces a "system of systems" and it demands special attention by C2ISR professionals under the direction of the C2ISR Package Commander to meet CINC objectives and Mission Commander's requirements. However, recent operations in Kosovo required US and allied aerospace forces to find well-hidden mobile targets, plan strikes against them, and execute the strikes before the targets moved. Though there were some "flex" targeting success stories, in general we were slow in responding to rapidly changing targeting needs. These deficiencies in the Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess (F2T2EA) process that reduced our success should be addressed. Sensors to find hidden targets, communication methods to get targeting data to an airborne attack aircraft, and the processes and systems in between, need to be improved and better integrated.
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These statements are indicative of the problems brewing in the prosecution of TST.
This process deserves much attention; otherwise, technological innovation will prove
ineffective. An understanding of C2 and ISR assets is essential to enhancing the TST process.
Airborne C2 and ISR Platforms Contributions to the TST Process
The following paragraphs give a brief overview of the capabilities of each platform in the TST process. It is a laundry list for the readers who are not familiar with C2 and ISR platforms. During emergencies or communications outages, the ACE conducts the aerospace battle in accordance with the latest command guidance and the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The establishment of an ACE is situation-dependent, based on assets and personnel available and guidance/direction from JFACC.
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Ground Platforms in the TST Process
The TACS is the backbone of the AFFOR's contribution to the Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS) and consists of units specifically trained and equipped to support the C2 Since this paper explores ways to find how to more efficiently prosecute TSTs, the focus here will be on the Combat Operations Division and its integration with the ISR Division.
The Combat Operations Division assumes responsibility for the next ATO (i.e., "tomorrow's war") as soon as the ATO is released, normally 12 hours prior to execution.
The ATO is written and disseminated based on intelligence estimates and other perishable data that may be 36 hours old or older. When the ATO is executed, changes in enemy (and friendly) capabilities, locations, and intent, along with weather and political conditions, may impact the planned operations. Defensive and Offensive Duty officers, specialty/support teams, and component liaisons coordinate and direct real time changes to the ATO/ACO to support mission requirements.
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The ISR Division provides current situational awareness, targeting, and ISR battle management for execution of the ATO. They integrate ISR personnel throughout the Combat Operations Division to secure all necessary ISR capabilities and assets to support JFC objectives across the complete range of aerospace operations. Additionally, ISR personnel within Combat Operation Division core teams monitor and synchronize employment of ISR capabilities and assets.
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The exact composition of the Combat Operations Division will be tailored to the contingency or exercise, but the general structure is presented in Figure 1 . The Combat Operations Division is normally task-organized into two functionally oriented core teams;
Offensive Operations and Defensive Operations, which are supported by integrated specialty/support teams, combat reports team, component and coalition/combined liaisons, and communications support.
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The following text is how the AOC will prosecute TSTs according to AOC 13-1 Vol 3.
Time Sensitive Target Function. Prosecution of a TST is one of the most challenging tasks of the Combat Operations Division. Per Joint Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, TSTs are "those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative fleeting targets of opportunity." The Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) is ultimately responsible for the existence of an expeditious process within the Combat Operations Division for prosecuting TSTs. This process may vary dependent on the situation, the theater and/or particular AOC procedures. Each member of that Combat Operations Division should be familiar with the established process for TST prosecution. Though processes and/or teams may vary, there is common AOC functionality that will occur within the Combat Operations Division. The common steps follow: Once a TST is input to the Combat Operations Division, the Combat Operations Division performs the following functions:
1. Procedurally identify and/or nominate a potential TST.
2. Assess a TST's priority as it relates to the established strategic guidance of the JFC and/or JFACC, the daily GAT guidance, and any predetermined TST hierarchy.
3. Identify potential assets/weapons for TST prosecution, applying JFC and/or JFACC guidance to minimize risk and collateral damage. TST Management. To prosecute a TST, the entire targeting cycle may be replicated; however, its functions are compressed in time. As such, some functions may occur in parallel while others are sequential. Predetermined guidance and/or some form of TST hierarchy or priority are vital to successful prosecution. If JFC and/or JFACC guidance for predetermined TST prosecution is not provided, the CCO should request it or advise in its generation. An asset management hierarchy may be developed to facilitate assets selection, for example:
1. Dedicated TST alert assets (threat permitting). 
Any other mission available.
TST ISR personnel have the following responsibilities:
Analyze the current battlespace for TST opportunities and forward nominations for approval.
Develop amplifying TST data for retasked strike assets.
Receive, validate, and nominate targets for immediate attack, considering current guidance, ROE, and attack restrictions. Reconnaissance as separate functions. ISR is described as a direct contribution to Information Superiority, a core competency. C2 is described as a "key enabler", not a core competency itself. C2 and ISR are expanded upon in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8 (Command and Control) and 2-5.2 (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance).
The draft update to AFDD 2-8 mentions the need for good information flow in the horizontal and vertical organizational directions, but doesn't provide specifics on how that should happen.
3 AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, is intended to explain the Air Force's perspective on information superiority and the relationship between information operations (IO) and its two major facets, information warfare (IW) and information-inwarfare (IIW). However, the current document is primarily focused on the offensive and defensive parts of IW and how they should be integrated with AOC operations. AFDD 2-5 relies on other documents in the series for a more detailed doctrinal discussion of IW and IIW, but none of them adequately address the relationship between C2 and ISR, nor the importance of integrating C2ISR to achieve information superiority.
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Emerging Doctrine
Recent ACC and AC2ISRC-drafted CONOPS have outlined emerging concepts in controlling theater forces. A new AOC CONOPS describes the AOC weapon system, its crew, and the corresponding processes they use to command and control theater forces.
Further CONOPS by ACC and the AC2ISRC work outlines processes and organization involved in managing ISR assets from the AOC level. CONOPS development is a crucial first step, but there is a need to more clearly define and institutionalize the linkages between ISR and C2 capabilities, processes, and organizations to execute the entire Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess (F2T2EA) kill chain. 5 The F2T2EA
kill chain is the sequence of events used to quantify how TSTs should be prosecuted.
Horizontal Integration
The goal of integrated C2ISR is to convey the right information at the right time to the shooter to prosecute a target within acceptable levels of risk. This goal requires C2
and ISR elements to coordinate and correlate information and forward it to the shooter in Another strong statement by Lambeth hits at the core of the issue:
"Once there, the aircraft (JSTARS) was typically thought of as a surveillance platform operating in the service of the intelligence community, rather than as a strike support asset working to provide direct and immediate assistance to NATO aircrews conducting flexible targeting missions. With the right teaming, connectivity, and practice, the use of Joint STARS to cue UAVs might have reduced, if not eliminated, the "searching-through-a-soda straw" problem, lessened UAV exposure to hostile fire, and helped maintain tactical surprise for NATO aircrews engaged in the search for VJ (Serbian Forces) targets of opportunity. No measures of that sort, however, were attempted until quite late in Allied Force". 
Vertical Integration
Operation ALLIED FORCE's C2 structure was cobbled together quickly. The lack of an AOC CONOPS or baseline AOC left planners with no standardized operational structure upon which to build. This deficiency has since been identified and there is now an AOC Baseline for equipment and an AOC CONOPS. Each Numbered
Air Force still has their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) and evidence has shown these SOPs are coming in line with the Air Force's standard. However, there are still some integration issues that require attention. As we have seen from previous examples in OAF and more currently, in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), a "Mother, may I" approach of over centralization is still recognized institutionally.
Genreal Horner (ret) said in a Joint Expeditionary Exercise 99 (JEFX99) After Action
Report that "the generals are still too involved in the execution of the war, we need to let the Captains fight the war with clear guidance".
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Research indicates most overly centralized operations occur due to extremely restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) and pressures put upon the CJTF to avoid collateral damage. 10 Over centralization results in a slow decision loop: Lambeth's AWOS study notes the following, "Unless an object of interest was clearly determined to be a valid military target, such as a VJ (Serbian) tank operating in the open, pilots had to get clearance for any attack from the CAOC, with General Short himself often making the decision after checking second sources like real-time UAV video feed. Because of the delays created by these and similar hurdles, orbiting NATO aircraft often ran low on fuel before being cleared to drop their weapons and accordingly were forced to leave the area in search of a tanker".
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This example of attacking VJ fielded forces and tanks using a Forward Air
Controller (FAC) clearly show how the authority to engage a target was overcentralized.
Yet, TSTs (such as SAM sites) detected by airborne sensors and on the CINC's priority list, also required the same authority. Doctrinally speaking, the tenet of "centralized control, decentralized execution" was not adhered to in OAF. A new example has come to the forefront with OEF. Major General Behler, Commander, AC2ISRC at Langley AFB, VA, sees centralized control and centralized execution as becoming the norm in OEF; especially in regards to use of its ISR assets in the TST area. 12 Maj Gen Behler also stated, "that the current war provided some great insight on the use of ISR and timesensitive-targeting, but that the environment was so permissive that we were able to accomplish the mission given the huge ISR shortfalls". He also stated that ISR needed to be tasked by the operator, not by the intelligence community.
13
Summing Up Procedural Deficiencies
Deficiencies in horizontal and vertical integration are both technical and procedural. Knowing the technical challenges are being worked currently by the AC2ISRC, this paper focuses upon the procedural problems. Let's sum up the deficiencies as a whole, combining both horizontal and vertical integration. The first deficiency is the lack of a "single belly button" at the tactical level to integrate and focus the C2 and ISR assets. The second problem is highly centralized decision-making authority for fleeting targets. This decision-making authority is often held by the JFACC, but is rarely delegated to the tactical level for decentralized TST execution. According to doctrine, the JTF and the JFACC have the authority to place this decision-making authority at the lowest level they see fit. Placing that decision-making authority on the ground or in the air is discussed in the next chapter. The third, and final, deficiency seen in the way C2 and ISR procedurally execute TSTs is how assets are tasked to support TST execution. Tasking of sensors needs to be done by an operator. An operator who possesses expertise in sensor capabilities and a thorough understanding of the ramifications such retasking places on sensors tasked against pre-planned missions in support of a mission commander, as opposed to tasking against a TSTs. With the advent of technologies (such as ISR Battle Management tools within the AOC), much more power to re-task and move ISR sensors has been given to the A-2. This sometimes puts the CMA -who is thinking about the collection deck for the next day -in direct conflict with the tactical mission objectives. To explain further, ISR asset taskings originate at many levels; national, operational, and tactical. When executing a TST, the ISR division in conjunction with the A-3 ISR cell, re-prioritize and re-task airborne sensors in order to provide the shooter battlespace awareness and targeting data on the TST. When the ISR cell retasks the sensors to TST, it may conflict with a pre-planned mission, such as support to an ingressing package. In the next chapter we will discuss conclusions and recommendations to fix these deficiencies in integration both through a rewrite of doctrine and organizational structure. Carl Jensen a contractor at ACC/DOYA that his major concern was "about the centralized control and "centralized execution" habits that were emanating from CENTCOM and Enduring Freedom's use of ISR assets in time sensitive targeting, versus the "decentralized execution" currently specified in AF Doctrine."
Notes
13 Meeting minutes form SAIC with MG Behler Commander, AC2ISRC, Jan 2002 Chapter 4
Conclusions and Recommendations
The capability of technology to alter organizational relationships may be invaluable or dysfunctional based on the effect it has on the organism.
--General Charles A Horner, Comments on EFX 98
Conclusions
To effectively execute attacks against TSTs, the JFC and component commanders must dictate clearly defined procedures for control and coordination of air operations. 1 .
C2, as defined in Joint Publication 1-02, is "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission". 2 C2 is accomplished on the tactical level with airborne and ground assets.
Without proper management and integration of ISR, the TST process will break down.
The unique requirements of C2 and ISR assets must be met in order to achieve success.
Each operational participant must rely on the capabilities of others to compensate for their own limitations -this is the main reason for combined/joint operations. Without knowledge of these factors, capabilities may be overlooked and participants may incur undue risks/hazards. C2, DCA, air refueling, electronic warfare support, and other supporting functions depend on classic management techniques to maintain combatcapable systems in place. For instance, most supporting forces operating orbits/stations require time windows of "vulnerability" instead of specific target times. More often than not, these windows exceed the unrefueled endurance of the weapons system. Air refueling must be managed closely to achieve complete coverage of station time and mission commander objectives. The tactical control agency can usually manage the flow but a higher authority, such as the mission commander or the AOC, will usually establish asset priorities. The goal of the C2ISR PC is to ensure mission commanders receive highly effective and coordinated C2ISR support. Since C2ISR is a system of systems, the focus should be to produce an integrated, executable C2ISR plan in direct support of the Mission Commander.
The C2ISR PC would be responsible for C2ISR tactical employment for an assigned time within the AOR for all missions requiring C2ISR support. This concept provides mission commanders a single person who will also be airborne and a part of the mission to contact for C2ISR coordination and prioritization to meet the assigned mission objectives. Instead of the mission commander having to coordinate with all supporting C2 and ISR assets separately, he will have one single "belly button", an operator, to contact and establish the priorities and concerns for the tasked mission. This does not prevent the mission commander from contacting all of the agencies independently, but provides a person whose sole responsibility is to support him/her with integrated and focused C2ISR. Since C2ISR is a system of systems, one operator needs to coordinate the overarching objectives and desired effects to develop a plan that encompasses all of the players and is based upon system strengths and weaknesses. This needs to be done at the tactical level of war by an operator who has had special training and is focused on the support of the mission commander. Current plans to develop C2 of ISR or ISR Battle
Management at the operational level of war will provide a more AOC-centric or very centralized version for TST execution. The redistribution of ISR assets from a collection manager on the ground will better prepare the battlespace for the next day's war, but will degrade the tactical focus of the assets assigned to support the mission commander attacking targets in real-time. By providing a C2ISR PC in the air to respond to fallout or system problems, the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution is not compromised.
Second Recommendation
The F2T2EA methodology mechanizes the operational level "kill chain." For example, theater and national assets/resources detect objectives of potential significance (find). These systems identify and determine the location of a target (fix). From this location, tracking systems acquire and monitor the object (track). Dynamic decisionmaking then directs resources (target), and applies capabilities (engage) in a timely and decisive manner. To achieve the desired effect, an assessment (assess) occurs during or after engagement to determine whether the target should be re-attacked. These sequential steps describe a critical path that must occur for each dynamic event. in the TST arena this is not the case. Perhaps it is the word "operational" kill chain that keeps it from working down to the tactical level. The kill chain needs to become as familiar to pilots and air battle managers as the air-to-air intercept phases. The kill chain should be taught from cradle-to-grave to all participants and refined at the USAFWS.
Institutionalizing this thought process for those platforms executing the kill chain will advance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) development. It is essential for operators to know where and how they fit into the process.
Final Thoughts
An overarching C2ISR CONOPS is needed to outline basic processes and organization to accomplish this. This should be followed by revisions to AF doctrine documents that describe how C2 and ISR work together to create dynamic battlespace awareness and allow rapid, accurate, command and control decisions. Joint doctrine should be amended to describe seamless links from ISR to C2 to weapon systems.
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Lessons Learned from OAF show the need for a tactically focused, coherent C2ISR
plan. Mission Commanders often felt C2ISR assets were not focused on the tactical objective and, therefore, support was not tailored to their needs. A single point of contact responsible for developing a coherent tactically oriented plan was needed: The C2ISR
PC meets this need. This concept provides a single "belly button" to Mission
Commanders for C2ISR coordination and prioritization, a practice that better supports the tactical mission and TST.
What is the value added of more closely integrating C2 and ISR? It will reduce the number of sorties required to accomplish the desired effects, which means fewer lives at risk within a hostile environment. The shortened operational cycle will increase our ability to destroy more mobile, time sensitive targets efficiently and effectively by distributing decision-making authority. All this results in a more effective force able to project and apply aerospace power to shape the international environment, deter conflict escalation into war, and decisively halt aggressors.
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Lt Gen Esmond, captures my perspective perfectly. He said:
"Modern information technology and communications allow for a great deal of information to move at the speed of light --faster even than an F-22 in afterburner. By thinking of C2 and ISR together as a team, we can release the brakes we are currently placing on available technology. This will keep us operating inside of our opponent's decision cycle and increase the force of aerospace power we bring to the fight". 
